tients in mental hospitals, they also used the camps as spaces to sharpen their definitions of national and religious identity. Emphasizing the significance of their work in maintaining natural resources, COs claimed their place among those who fought for the nation’s defense, even as they maintained their religious commitment to pacifism.

Less convincing, however, is the book’s treatment of racial and economic inequality in the history of Mennonite California during the 1950s and 1960s. For example, Froese explains that following World War II, the demographics in the neighborhood around the Calvary Mennonite Church in Los Angeles shifted from mostly white and Latino to primarily African American. Citing “racial issues,” white church members joined white flight and opted to let go of their commitment to a community of reconciliation in favor of maintaining ethnic and racial homogeneity (102). Yet, in this and other instances of racial tension, Froese misses an opportunity to interrogate its meaning for broader understandings of race and how it changes white California Mennonites’ ethno-religious identity. Moreover, the story of these African American Mennonites or the Latino Mennonites, who presumably carried on after their white peers left, plays only a minor role in the story Froese tells. Including those stories would have strengthened Froese’s narrative of a more racially and ethnically diverse Mennonite community in California.

Nevertheless, this narrative of continuity and change among Mennonites in California complicates tired notions of an unchanging ethno-religious, pacifist, agrarian community and broadens our understanding of American religious history. Uncovering their stories and contextualizing them in American history, this book enriches the history of American Mennonites and California’s cultural history.

David J. Cameron

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Placing the Civil War in an agrarian context, R. Douglas Hurt analyzes how southern agricultural power crumbled as the Confederate government failed to respond adequately to the growing crisis. Hurt offers an important addendum to the standard southern military optimism that one Confederate soldier could
whip ten Yankee soldiers. At the outbreak of war, he argues, not only were southern farmers “confident that agriculture would help the South gain independence,” but also that northern farmers would be unable to adjust to the loss of southern markets, thus “agricultural weakness would be an Achilles’ heel for the North” (9). Southern farmers did well in the first year, increasing their acreage and production of corn, wheat, and potatoes, providing adequate food supplies, and making plenty of money in the process. But price increases by the end of 1861 began to indicate growing shortages. Despite constant calls for farmers to voluntarily cut back production of cash crops and plant more food crops, years passed before any centralized agricultural policy appeared. Once the Confederate government finally took action in early 1863, its policies exacerbated the shortages. Under the Impressment Act (passed in March), government agents paid such below-market prices for supplies that farmers ultimately refused to bring goods to larger towns out of fear of having their goods seized. Yet, impressment was a disorganized and localized process.

Only with the passage of the Tax in Kind Act on April 24, 1863 did the Confederate Congress “finally take some institutional responsibility for crafting agricultural policy” (132). The act dictated that farmers had to contribute 10 percent of their produce—beyond what was needed for their own subsistence—to the government. However, by then production had been dramatically curtailed by countless problems—Union capture of productive southern lands, crops ruined by poor weather, livestock diseases that reduced the amount of meat available for consumption, and the inadequate and decaying Confederate transportation system that limited the movement of goods from farms to fighting men. Meanwhile, food prices skyrocketed. Paying particular attention to the rising cost of food, Hurt regularly, if not systematically, details the price of food supplies in Confederate cities throughout the war. Hurt concludes, “the Confederacy did not mobilize agriculture for either a short or long war,” relying instead on voluntarism to produce adequate food supplies. When the government finally became involved in 1863, its “directives proved too little regulation too late, and they were poorly enforced” (289).

Though full of a wealth of financial data and revealing anecdotes, the book continually switches from chapters on the eastern to the western theaters, covering the same chronological ground. Similar problems plagued both fronts, thus rendering some of the descriptions redundant and even tedious. Civil War scholars will be disappointed by the numerous factual errors throughout the book—e.g., Hurt wrongly claims General Lee moved north in September 1862
to “encircle” Washington (86); he confuses the commanders of various armies in 1863 (140); and he erroneously asserts that the Confederates lost the battle of Chickamauga (187). While it does not advance any radical new interpretations, this work will be useful and informative for those not familiar with the important agricultural dimensions of the Civil War in the South.

Judkin Browning

Appalachian State University


Bartow J. Elmore has written a new, sometimes brilliant, occasionally frustrating, business and environmental history of Coca-Cola. This is not a Whiggish account of the soft drink company’s global conquest. Nor is it a straightforward story of imperial plunder. It is not an updated account of Coke’s branding savvy either. Elmore does not even try to decode the secret formula. Instead, he tells a story of Coke as a model of post-Fordist capitalism, where firms stayed light and nimble and outsourced as much of their costs and operations as possible.

Coke, according to Elmore, was, then, the precursor by almost six decades of current global titans Nike and Apple. Unlike its contemporaries US Steel or General Motors, the Atlanta syrup maker did not pour money into material processing, transportation facilities, or even hulking factories. It lived lean, with a smallish workforce and limited capital investment. Early Coke generated its spectacular profits by externalizing as much of its operations as possible, leaving the government and local communities to pick up the tab for expanding markets overseas; providing vast qualities of cheap, clean water; disposing of piles of empty glass, plastic, and aluminum containers; taking care of recycling; and dealing with the complex health and social costs associated with liquid and sugar-enhanced obesity.

Elmore’s inquiry is built on an imaginative, but sometimes bulky, narrative structure. Each chapter looks at a critical ingredient found in the drink and the social, political, and environmental costs of extraction. Beginning with water, the book investigates the far-flung commodity chains Coke constructed for coca leaves, caffeine, coffee beans, sugar, and high fructose corn syrup. But there is another element to the book’s structure. As he moves through the ingredients, Elmore also tells a chronological story of the company, tracing Coke’s sweeping